讲座主题：The (biased) Wisdom from the Crowd
华体会入口:讲座地点：腾讯集会ID：724 498 620
佳宾简介：周臻，清华华体会入口五道口金融学院助理传授，纽约华体会入口博士。研讨范畴：金融市场磨擦的实际研讨和信息经济学，包含金融危急和羁系、公司金融、体系性危险和金融收集等相干题目的研讨。曾在American Economic Review等国际权势巨子期刊颁发论文。
内容择要：This paper studies a collective decision-making scheme: each agent pays a fixed cost to participate in a project and receives a common value, only if the number of participantssurpasses a pre-specified threshold. When each agent has some dispersed private knowledge about this common value (individual wisdom) and makes the participation decision simultaneously, we find information aggregation is not efficient. In the unique monotone equilibrium, agents choose to participate even when their private information indicates otherwise. As such, some projects with value lower than the participation cost get initiated. We extend the model to show that this bias cannot be corrected when agents play the game dynamically with opportunities to learn from the past history of participation. We further apply the insights from our theory to three applications, namely, the All-or-Noting crowdfunding, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending, and excludable public good provision.